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BACKGROUND
In 2016, Medicare implemented Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR), a 
national mandatory bundled-payment model for hip or knee replacement in ran-
domly selected metropolitan statistical areas. Hospitals in such areas receive bonuses 
or pay penalties based on Medicare spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode 
(defined as the hospitalization plus 90 days after discharge).
METHODS
We conducted difference-in-differences analyses using Medicare claims from 2015 
through 2017, encompassing the first 2 years of bundled payments in the CJR pro-
gram. We evaluated hip- or knee-replacement episodes in 75 metropolitan statistical 
areas randomly assigned to mandatory participation in the CJR program (bundled-
payment metropolitan statistical areas, hereafter referred to as “treatment” areas) as 
compared with those in 121 control areas, before and after implementation of the CJR 
model. The primary outcomes were institutional spending per hip- or knee-replace-
ment episode (i.e., Medicare payments to institutions, primarily to hospitals and 
post–acute care facilities), rates of postsurgical complications, and the percentage of 
“high-risk” patients (i.e., patients for whom there was an elevated risk of spending 
— a measure of patient selection). Analyses were adjusted for the hospital and char-
acteristics of the patients and procedures.
RESULTS
From 2015 through 2017, there were 280,161 hip- or knee-replacement procedures in 
803 hospitals in treatment areas and 377,278 procedures in 962 hospitals in control 
areas. After the initiation of the CJR model, there were greater decreases in institu-
tional spending per joint-replacement episode in treatment areas than in control areas 
(differential change [i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the period 
before the CJR model], −$812, or a −3.1% differential decrease relative to the treat-
ment-group baseline; P<0.001). The differential reduction was driven largely by a 5.9% 
relative decrease in the percentage of episodes in which patients were discharged to 
post–acute care facilities. The CJR program did not have a significant differential ef-
fect on the composite rate of complications (P = 0.67) or on the percentage of joint-
replacement procedures performed in high-risk patients (P = 0.81).
CONCLUSIONS
In the first 2 years of the CJR program, there was a modest reduction in spending per 
hip- or knee-replacement episode, without an increase in rates of complications. 
(Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and the National Institute on Aging of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health.)
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Bundled Payments for Joint Replacement
In April 2016, Medicare initiated Com-prehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR), a mandatory bundled-payment model for in-
patient replacement of the hip or knee.1 In the 
CJR program, hospitals are held accountable for 
spending for an episode of care, which includes 
the index hospitalization for the procedure plus 
all spending (with minor exceptions specified by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) 
in the 90 days after discharge.2 In contrast to the 
voluntary nature of other alternative payment 
models, CJR randomly assigns metropolitan sta-
tistical areas to mandatory participation.3,4 Hos-
pitals in areas that are randomly assigned to the 
CJR program are subject to bundled payments 
for all episodes of hip or knee replacement.
Like other bundled-payment programs,5,6 CJR 
was designed to provide financial incentives for 
hospitals to reduce spending without compro-
mising quality across an entire episode of care 
during the index hospitalization and after dis-
charge. During a CJR episode, fee-for-service pay-
ments are made as usual to all providers (e.g., 
outpatient physicians or skilled nursing facilities). 
Participating hospitals then undergo an annual 
retrospective reconciliation process in which their 
average spending per episode is compared with 
a hospital-specific benchmark. Hospitals share 
savings with Medicare if spending falls below 
the benchmark or, starting in 2017, they pay a 
penalty if spending exceeds the target.1,2 As with 
the accountable care organization programs in 
Medicare,7,8 the savings or losses of hospitals are 
adjusted according to their performance in a mix 
of hip- or knee-replacement quality measures 
such as rates of complications.
Voluntary bundled-payment programs have 
been associated with either unchanged or reduced 
spending without deterioration in quality.9-11 How-
ever, changes observed in these programs could 
be due to the selective participation of highly 
motivated hospitals and providers.12,13 As com-
pared with previous voluntary programs, CJR is 
an important advance because it features both a 
randomized design and mandatory participation. 
Evaluations of the first year of CJR showed mod-
est although not always significant decreases in 
total spending, without changes in quality.14,15 As 
CJR matures, it is unclear whether these savings 
will become larger and whether negative unin-
tended consequences, such as hospitals declining 
to treat sicker patients whose care could poten-
tially be more costly,12,13 will become evident.
We compared changes in spending and quality 
in the first 2 years of the CJR program between 
areas that were randomly assigned to the new 
bundled-payment model (“treatment” areas) and 
control areas. We also evaluated any potentially 
unintended consequences such as the selection 
of healthier patients for hip or knee replacement 
or an increased volume of these procedures.
Me thods
Study Population
We analyzed Medicare claims and enrollment 
data from 2015 through 2017 on Medicare fee-
for-service beneficiaries who underwent inpatient 
primary hip- or knee-replacement procedures 
(diagnosis-related group [DRG] 469 or DRG 470 
at discharge) at hospitals in one of the 196 met-
ropolitan statistical areas that were eligible for 
participation in the CJR program (Fig. S1 in the 
Supplementary Appendix, available with the full 
text of this article at NEJM.org). Revisions of 
previous hip- or knee-replacement procedures 
were not included in the CJR program. The unit 
of analysis was an episode of hip or knee replace-
ment, defined as the period between the date of 
admission for hospitalization and 90 days after 
discharge.
The CJR program began in April 2016. In our 
study, the 12-month period before the initiation of 
the CJR model included procedures performed 
between January 1 and December 31, 2015, and 
the 15-month period after the initiation of the 
CJR model included procedures that occurred 
between July 1, 2016, and September 30, 2017. 
We used data through December 31, 2017, to 
cover the 90-day period after hospital discharge 
for all hip- or knee-replacement procedures; this 
encompassed the period used by CJR to assess 
performance in years 1 and 2 of the program. In 
the primary analysis, we excluded episodes that 
began during a 6-month transition period from 
January 1 through June 30, 2016, since during 
this time hip- or knee-replacement episodes over-
lapped into the period after the initiation of the 
CJR model or occurred early after initiation of 
the program, when hospitals may have been 
adjusting to the new payment model.
For each patient who underwent a hip- or 
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knee-replacement procedure, including those who 
did and those who did not have a hip fracture, 
we included the first admission for joint replace-
ment during the 2015–2017 period. We excluded 
episodes for patients with active end-stage renal 
disease and episodes with any additional hip- or 
knee-replacement procedures (e.g., sequential knee 
replacements) in the 90 days after discharge 
from the index hospitalization. We also excluded 
joint-replacement procedures performed in hos-
pitals that participated in the Bundled Payments 
for Care Improvement (BPCI) program for hip- or 
knee-replacement procedures16 and any episode 
of hip or knee replacement in which the patient 
was discharged to a skilled nursing facility or 
home health agency that participated in the BPCI 
program for hip- or knee-replacement procedures.
We applied one additional exclusion criterion 
that was not part of the CJR program. To assess 
coexisting conditions in the patients and to en-
sure that we captured all care within the epi-
sode, we limited our analyses to patients who 
were continuously enrolled in fee-for-service 
Medicare Part A and Part B for 12 months before 
the hip- or knee-replacement episode through 90 
days after discharge or until death. A compari-
son of the overall Medicare population and the 
continuously enrolled population is provided in 
Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
This study was approved by the institutional 
review board at Harvard Medical School. Informed 
consent was waived because the data were de-
identified.
Study Variables
Randomization
Of 380 metropolitan statistical areas in the 
United States, 196 were identified as being eli-
gible for the CJR program on the basis of volume 
of hip- or knee-replacement procedures and par-
ticipation in the BPCI program (Methods section 
A in the Supplementary Appendix). Medicare 
categorized the 196 eligible areas into strata ac-
cording to the median population (two strata). 
Each population stratum was then differentiated 
according to quartile of spending per hip- or 
knee-replacement episode before the initiation 
of the CJR model (four strata), for a total of eight 
strata. Within each stratum, Medicare then ran-
domly assigned areas to treatment or control 
groups. The probability that an area would be 
assigned to mandatory participation in the CJR 
program was higher among areas with higher 
spending before the initiation of the program 
than among those with lower spending. To ad-
dress potential bias from regression to the mean 
that would otherwise result from the oversam-
pling within higher-spending strata, areas were 
weighted to equalize the probability of assign-
ment to the treatment group within each of the 
eight strata (Methods section A in the Supple-
mentary Appendix).
The initial randomization was announced by 
Medicare in July 2015,2 but in November 2015, 
Medicare cut the number of metropolitan statis-
tical areas that were randomly assigned to the 
CJR intervention from 75 to 67, largely because 
of updates in hospital participation in the BPCI 
program (Methods section A in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix). Because these cuts were not ran-
dom, we conducted an intention-to-treat analysis 
based on the initial randomization, in which all 
patients who underwent hip or knee replacement 
in hospitals in the initially randomly assigned 75 
metropolitan statistical areas made up the treat-
ment population and patients in the remaining 
121 metropolitan statistical areas made up the 
control population.
Patient, Hospital, and Procedure Characteristics
From Medicare enrollment files, we determined 
the patients’ age, sex, and race or ethnic group; 
the rural or urban categorization of their ZIP 
Code of residence17; the original reason for 
Medicare enrollment (i.e., disability or age); their 
Medicaid enrollment; and the presence of 27 
chronic conditions from the Chronic Conditions 
Data Warehouse.18 For each joint-replacement 
episode, we assessed the type of procedure (hip 
or knee replacement and total or partial replace-
ment), the DRG, and whether the patient had a 
hip fracture.
Primary Outcomes
Our first primary outcome was institutional 
spending, which included Medicare payments to 
a hospital (inpatient or outpatient), post–acute 
care facility, or hospice, as well as spending on 
durable medical equipment (further details are 
provided in Methods section B in the Supple-
mentary Appendix). We chose institutional spend-
ing as a primary outcome because it makes up 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at Washington University in St. Louis Becker Library on May 2, 2019. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2019 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
n engl j med 380;3 nejm.org January 17, 2019 255
Bundled Payments for Joint Replacement
approximately 85% of all spending on hip- or 
knee-replacement episodes, it is the component 
of spending in which previous studies of bun-
dled payments for hip or knee replacement have 
shown savings,9,19 and data on noninstitutional 
spending (payments for physicians and other 
providers, ambulance services, and independent 
laboratories) were available for only a 20% ran-
dom sample of Medicare beneficiaries (additional 
details are provided in Table S2 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix).
Our second primary outcome was a composite 
measure of complications of hip or knee replace-
ment that was developed and used by Medicare 
for public reporting.20 In this measure, a compli-
cation was defined as any of several medical 
complications (e.g., pulmonary embolism) or sur-
gical complications (e.g., joint infection) during 
the procedure or within 90 days after the admis-
sion date (full details are provided in Methods 
section B in the Supplementary Appendix). We 
included all patients in this quality measure.
Our third primary outcome was the percent-
age of patients undergoing hip- or knee-replace-
ment procedures for whom there was at elevated 
risk of high overall spending in the joint-replace-
ment episode. In the CJR model, hospitals have 
a financial incentive to selectively decline to treat 
sicker patients whose care may be more expen-
sive, because the CJR program does not adjust the 
benchmark of each hospital for patient factors 
other than the presence of a hip fracture.21 We 
estimated each patient’s burden of illness for 
each episode by estimating a “risk score” that 
was based on predicted total spending per epi-
sode. Risk scores were estimated with the use of 
a linear regression model predicting total spend-
ing for each episode fitted with data incorporat-
ing patient characteristics from 2013 through 
2014 (before the initiation of the CJR model) 
(Methods section C in the Supplementary Appen-
dix). Using this model, we assigned each episode 
to a quartile-of-risk score and assessed the per-
centage of hip- or knee-replacement procedures 
performed in patients in the highest quartile.
Secondary Outcomes
We examined several secondary outcomes that 
are detailed in Methods section B in the Supple-
mentary Appendix. Using claims from a 20% 
random sample of beneficiaries, we measured 
total Medicare spending per hip- or knee-replace-
ment episode. Utilization measures included the 
use of post–acute care services according to facil-
ity type, length of stay in post–acute care facili-
ties, and readmission or visits to an emergency 
department within 90 days after discharge. We 
also measured mortality at 90 days and compli-
cations excluding hip fractures, as used by Medi-
care for public reporting. We examined differen-
tial changes (i.e., the between-group differences 
in the change from the period before the CJR 
model) in the DRG used for hip- or knee-replace-
ment episodes (469 or 470), the mean risk score, 
sociodemographic characteristics, and the pres-
ence of chronic coexisting conditions. To assess 
the contribution of differential changes in observ-
able patient characteristics to our estimates, we 
also evaluated the results of our primary analy-
sis with and without adjustment for characteris-
tics of the patients and episodes.
Statistical Analysis
Our primary analysis involved a difference-in-
differences approach. We fit a linear regression 
model at the hip- or knee-replacement episode 
level with adjustment for characteristics of the 
patients and procedures as well as for hospital 
and metropolitan statistical area random effects 
to control for time-invariant differences between 
treatment and control hospitals and areas, as 
well as fixed effects for each quarter of our study 
period (see Methods section D in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix). The key variable in the model 
was an interaction between the period after the 
initiation of the CJR model and an indicator for 
the procedure being performed in a treatment 
area; this describes the mean differential change 
in the outcome for episodes in treatment areas 
relative to those in control areas (i.e., the esti-
mated effect of the CJR program). In a prespeci-
fied alternative modeling approach, we used hos-
pital fixed effects with robust variance estimators 
at the metropolitan statistical area level (Meth-
ods section D in the Supplementary Appendix). 
In sensitivity analyses, we examined generalized 
linear models with a log link and mean propor-
tional to variance function for continuous out-
comes and logistic-regression models for binary 
outcomes. Finally, in post hoc analyses, we also 
compared outcomes in three 6-month periods 
from April through September 2016, October 
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2016 through March 2017, and April through 
September 2017 (Methods section D in the Sup-
plementary Appendix). In addition, we used 
publicly released data1 on the net reconciliation 
payments made by Medicare to hospitals in the 
first 2 years of CJR to estimate the net savings 
or loss to Medicare (Methods section E in the 
Supplementary Appendix).
There were no significant differences in the 
trends between the treatment and control areas 
before the initiation of the CJR model for each 
outcome in 2015, the “pre-period” used in our 
models (Table S3 in the Supplementary Appendix). 
Because 2015 is a single year, we also compared 
trends before the initiation of the CJR model over 
a longer period (2011 through 2015) in a post hoc 
analysis (more details are provided in Methods 
section F in the Supplementary Appendix).
To adjust for multiple testing, we set the sig-
nificance level for each of the three primary out-
comes at less than 0.0167 (0.05÷3). We provide 
95% confidence intervals, without P values, for 
exploratory estimates of secondary outcomes, 
which were not adjusted for multiple testing.
Our analytic protocol was prespecified and is 
available at NEJM.org. The protocol was pub-
lished before we performed the analyses of data 
from the period after the initiation of the CJR 
model.22
R esult s
Study Population
From 2015 through 2017, a total of 280,161 hip- or 
knee-replacement procedures were performed in 
803 hospitals in treatment areas and 377,278 pro-
cedures were performed in 962 hospitals in con-
trol areas (unweighted). In the treatment areas, 
7% of the procedures were performed in the 
8 areas that were excluded after randomization. 
In 2015, before the initiation of the CJR model, 
there were differences between patient character-
istics in the treatment versus control areas; for 
example, 11.4% of the episodes were for Medicaid-
eligible patients in the treatment areas, as com-
pared with 10.3% in the control areas (Table 1). 
There were meaningful differences in the char-
acteristics of hospitals and counties in the treat-
ment areas versus control areas in 2015 (Tables 
S4 and S5 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Variable
Treatment 
 Group  
(N = 102,089)
Control 
 Group  
(N = 143,824)
Mean age (yr) 74.5 74.3
Male sex (%) 35.9 36.0
DRG (%)
DRG 469, hip or knee replacement with 
major complication  or coexisting  
condition
5.6 5.1
DRG 470, hip or knee replacement without 
major complication or coexisting  
condition
94.4 94.9
Fracture (%) 16.2 15.0
Procedure (%)
Total knee replacement 54.2 56.2
Total hip replacement 31.4 30.9
Race or ethnic group (%)†
Non-Hispanic white 89.8 90.8
Non-Hispanic black 5.9 5.6
Hispanic 1.1 0.7
Asian 1.0 0.6
Other 2.2 2.2
Original reason for Medicare enrollment (%)
Age >65 yr 84.2 84.1
Disability 15.7 15.8
End-stage renal disease‡ 0.1 0.1
Eligible for Medicaid (%) 11.4 10.3
Urban residence (%)§ 85.0 82.4
Previous inpatient care (%) 20.4 19.7
Previous post–acute care  services (%) 7.7 7.2
Chronic conditions (mean no.)¶ 7.1 7.0
*  Weighted numbers of patients are shown. CJR denotes Comprehensive Care 
for Joint Replacement, and DRG diagnosis-related group.
†  Race or ethnic group was determined from the Medicare Master Beneficiary 
Summary Files. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.
‡  Patients with end-stage renal disease were excluded from the payment pro-
gram. However, some patients initially qualified for Medicare because of end-
stage renal disease but were no longer classified as having this disease at the 
time of the hip or knee replacement.
§  Urban residence, which was determined with the use of the Health Resources 
and Services Administration Rural–Urban Commuting Area Codes database 
(www . depts . washington . edu/ uwruca/ index . php), was defined as residence in 
a “metropolitan” ZIP Code. Data were missing for 0.16% of episodes that pri-
marily occurred in Puerto Rico.
¶  We assessed patients for the presence of 27 conditions from the Chronic 
Conditions Data Warehouse, which uses claims since 1999 to describe the ac-
cumulated chronic disease burden in Medicare beneficiaries (a list of condi-
tions is provided in Methods section C in the Supplementary Appendix).
Table 1. Characteristics of the Patients in 2015, before Implementation  
of the CJR Model.*
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Spending and Utilization
Institutional spending on hip- or knee-replace-
ment episodes decreased from $25,903 to $23,915 
in the treatment group and from $24,596 to 
$23,238 in the control group (adjusted differen-
tial change between the treatment group and the 
control group, −$812; P<0.001), or a 3.1% dif-
ferential decrease relative to mean spending in 
treatment areas before the CJR intervention 
(Fig. 1 and Table 2). This decrease in institu-
tional spending grew over the 18-month period 
of CJR implementation from a differential change 
of −$541 in April through September 2016 (95% 
confidence interval [CI], −754 to −328) to −$860 
in April through September 2017 (95% CI, 
−1,075 to −645) (Table S6 in the Supplementary 
Appendix).
The reduction in differential spending was 
driven largely by reduced spending at post–acute 
care facilities: skilled nursing facilities (adjusted 
differential change, −$527; 95% CI, −611 to −443) 
and inpatient rehabilitation facilities (adjusted 
differential change, −$227; 95% CI, −274 to −180). 
In the 20% sample of beneficiaries, total spend-
ing for hip- or knee-replacement procedures (in-
cluding all professional fees in addition to pay-
ments to institutions) differentially decreased by 
$1,084 (95% CI, −1,409 to −760), or a 3.6% dif-
ferential reduction (Table 3). On the basis of 
Medicare reconciliation payments of $872 per 
hip- or knee-replacement episode to hospitals 
Figure 1. Adjusted Trends in Primary Outcomes,  
2015–2017.
Shown are adjusted estimates for each of the three 
 primary outcomes: institutional spending (Panel A), 
the rate of complications of hip or knee replacement 
(Panel B), and the percentage of patients undergoing 
these procedures who were in the top risk-score quar-
tile (Panel C). All estimates are adjusted for hospital 
and metropolitan statistical areas as random effects. 
Estimates of institutional spending and complication 
rates are also adjusted for characteristics of the patients 
and episodes, as described in Methods section D in the 
Supplementary Appendix. The percentage of patients 
in the highest quartile of risk was not adjusted for 
characteristics of the patients and episodes because 
these characteristics are used to generate the patient 
risk score, which uses coefficients estimated from 
2013–2014 data. In Panel A, the inset shows the same 
data on an enlarged y axis.
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from 2016 through 2017, the average net reduc-
tion in total Medicare spending per episode was 
$212, or a 0.7% relative decrease (Methods sec-
tion E in the Supplementary Appendix). There 
was no significant differential change in the per 
capita volume of hip- or knee-replacement epi-
sodes between the treatment areas and control 
areas after the CJR intervention (Table S7 in the 
Supplementary Appendix).
The CJR program was associated with a 
2.5-percentage-point (95% CI, −3.0 to −2.1) dif-
ferential decrease (or a 5.9% relative decrease) in 
the percentage of patients discharged to post–
acute care facilities and a differential reduction 
of 1.7 days in the length of stay in post–acute 
care facilities among those in any post–acute 
care facility (95% CI, −2.0 to −1.4) (Table 3). 
Estimates of these outcomes were not substan-
tively different with the use of models with fixed 
effects, generalized linear models, or logistic-
regression models (Table S8 in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix).
Quality Outcomes
The CJR program did not have a significant 
differential effect on the composite rate of com-
plications (adjusted differential change in the 
percentage of episodes associated with a compli-
cation, −0.04%; P = 0.67) (Fig. 1 and Table 2). In 
sensitivity analyses excluding admissions for hip 
fracture, results were similar (adjusted differen-
tial change in the percentage of episodes associ-
ated with a complication, −0.05%; 95% CI, −0.2 
to 0.1) (Table 3). The program had no significant 
negative effect on the use of hospitals after dis-
charge (inpatient, emergency department, or ob-
servation stay) or on mortality (Table 3).
Risk Selection
There was no significant differential change in 
our primary outcome for patient selection, in the 
change in the percentage of patients in the top 
risk-score quartile (differential change) (Fig. 1 
and Table 2), or in the average patient risk 
score (Table S9 in the Supplementary Appen-
dix). In treatment areas, there was a differen-
tial decrease in the percentage of patients who 
originally enrolled in Medicare because of dis-
ability (−0.6 percentage points; 95% CI, −1.0 to 
−0.2; or relative change of −3.8%) (Table S10 in 
the Supplementary Appendix). However, the 
estimated effect of the CJR program on spend-T
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ing per episode was reduced by only 2.5% after 
adjustments for observed characteristics of the 
patients before accounting for characteristics 
of the episodes (Table S11 in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix).
Discussion
We found that through the first 2 years of the 
CJR program, the program modestly reduced pay-
ments per hip- or knee-replacement episode with-
out any significant change in rates of complica-
tions. This decrease in payments grew over an 
18-month period, which raises the possibility 
that CJR could lead to greater reductions in pay-
ments as hospitals adapt to the new payment 
model. The 3% reduction in payments was sig-
nificantly offset by bonuses paid by Medicare to 
hospitals with spending below their CJR bench-
mark, although even after these payments, there 
was a small net savings.1,23
Since the CJR program is one of the only 
payment models in Medicare implemented as a 
mandatory randomized trial, it is an unusual 
experiment in payment reform. The mandatory 
participation in the CJR program generated con-
siderable controversy, culminating in the Trump 
administration transitioning the program to a 
partly voluntary model as of March 2018.24 Al-
though the future of mandatory payment models 
is uncertain, the CJR program helps address the 
question of whether savings seen in previous 
evaluations of bundled-payment programs were 
attributable to the select nature of the hospitals 
that volunteered. Our findings suggest that the 
changes observed in voluntary programs may be 
echoed in mandatory programs.
Decreased Medicare spending on hip- and 
knee-replacement episodes at hospitals in the 
CJR program was nearly exclusively related to 
reductions in the use of post–acute care services 
in skilled nursing facilities and inpatient rehabili-
tation facilities. This is not surprising, because 
post–acute care services are a large and highly 
variable fraction of spending in hip- or knee-
replacement episodes25,26 and hospitals have strong 
financial incentives to reduce the frequency of 
post–acute care services. We did not find a 
negative effect on the rate of complications, re-
admissions, or death under the CJR program; 
therefore, it appears that hospitals may have 
successfully identified patients who are at the 
margin of needing post–acute care services who 
could instead be safely discharged home with 
home health services. However, our measures of 
quality do not include important patient-centered 
measures such as functional status, pain, and 
overall satisfaction. There may have been a 
negative effect on these dimensions of quality 
that we did not observe.
Our results are consistent with previous 
data showing that savings in bundled-payment 
models9,14,15,19,25,27 and other alternative payment 
models28,29 have been concentrated in changing 
the use of post–acute care services. Post–acute 
care services may be the easiest target for hospi-
tals to decrease episode-level spending because 
it is often unclear when these services are benefi-
cial or what intensity of post–acute care is most 
appropriate.30-32
One concern about current bundled-payment 
programs is that they create a financial incentive 
to treat healthier patients rather than those who 
are sicker and whose care may be more costly. 
There has been inconsistent evidence on risk 
selection in previous evaluations of voluntary 
bundling and the CJR program.9,33 Although we 
did not see any substantive changes in our out-
come of primary risk selection, in treatment 
areas, we found evidence of differential reduc-
tions in the percentage of disabled patients un-
dergoing hip- or knee-replacement procedures. 
Adjustment for these and other observable char-
acteristics of the patients had a minor effect on 
our estimates of savings. However, we could not 
examine whether changes in other unobserved 
risk factors for high spending after surgery may 
have contributed to our results. Close monitor-
ing for risk selection under the CJR program is 
warranted.
Our study has several limitations. Our con-
clusions regarding the effects of bundled pay-
ments may not be generalizable beyond hip- or 
knee-replacement procedures,34 and our evalua-
tion covers only the first 2 years of the program. 
However, because the CJR model transitioned to 
a partly voluntary model 3 months after the end 
of our study period, our evaluation encompasses 
all but 2 months when the model was mandatory. 
Our evaluation focused on payments from Medi-
care and did not assess the overall financial ef-
fect on hospitals. Finally, our estimate of savings 
may be an underestimate of the true effect of 
bundled payments because we included hip- or 
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knee-replacement episodes performed in eight 
metropolitan statistical areas (accounting for 7% 
of treatment episodes) that were originally ran-
domly assigned to participate in the CJR program 
but then were subsequently excluded.
In conclusion, we found that in the first 
2 years of the CJR program, mandatory bundled-
payment models for joint replacement led to 
modest decreases in spending per episode. These 
decreases were driven by a reduced use of post–
acute care services, without any major change in 
the rate of complications.
A data sharing statement provided by the authors is available 
with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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